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Abstract: This paper investigates determinants and consequences of net asset value dis-
counts in listed private equity funds. Listed private equity funds share characteristics of
closed-end mutual funds and traditional unlisted private equity funds and can therefore oﬀer
insights into both. Our results have particular relevance to the pricing of unlisted private
equity funds where no market prices are observable. We ﬁnd that funds start at an initial
premium of –2.5% and adapt to the long-term average of –21% after two years. Fund re-
turns display a U-shaped seasonality, which is related to publishing dates of annual reports.
Stock performance is exceptionally weak in buyout funds after their initial public oﬀering.
Premia predict future stock returns and are explained by liquidity and by investor sentiment,
but not by the fund’s investment degree. A decrease in premia over the ﬁrst few quarters
after the fund’s IPO remains unexplained, which partially supports the management ability
hypothesis. Private equity fund premia depend on credit markets and systematic risk. This
relation suggests that some information about the fund’s portfolio is not reﬂected in net
asset values, which seem to proxy for future fund cash ﬂows.
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11 Introduction
Since the emergence of exchange traded private equity1 funds (listed private equity, LPE)
as an asset class in the 1990’s, these vehicles have constantly been trading at a discount to
their respective net asset value (NAV). If listed private equity funds were similar to holding
companies, they should trade at a premium on average. Historically, book-to-market ratios
in stocks have been well below one (see, for example, Loughran (1997) and Kothari and
Shanken (1997)). This translates into an average NAV premium for stocks, not into a
discount. One can also view listed private equity funds as traded portfolios of unlisted
companies. If this was the correct perspective, these funds would be more similar to mutual
funds which also represent a portfolio, albeit of securities instead of unlisted shares. The
cross-sectional average NAV discount in closed-end mutual funds is almost always positive
and has been moving in the range between 5% and 15% over the past 20 years. (Cherkes
et al. (2008), Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999). During the same time, listed private equity
funds showed an average discount to NAV of about 15%.
This paper investigates the causes and consequences of discounts in listed private equity
funds. We will refer to the ratio of market value to the fund’s net asset value as its “pre-
mium”. The importance of listed private equity funds is that they bridge the gap between
closed-end mutual funds, unlisted private equity funds and listed holding companies. It is
thus not immediately clear which theories apply. If premia could be successfully explained,
our results would have implications for the pricing of private equity funds and in particular
secondary transactions, since there are usually no market prices observable for traditional
private equity funds.
We ﬁnd many similarities between premia in listed private equity funds and closed-end
funds but also several striking diﬀerences. LPE funds do not start with a premium like
closed-end mutual funds but show a negative premium of -2.5% instead. This premium
takes about 2 years to adjust to the long-term average of -21%. This behavior is very
1We use the term “private equity” to refer to venture capital funds and buyout funds
2similar to traditional private equity funds. Premia predict future stock returns, what we
interpret as mean reversion following Pontiﬀ (1995). We document a U-shaped seasonality
in fund returns with higher-than-average returns in the ﬁrst quarter and lower returns in the
second and third. This pattern cannot be explained by the usual arguments involving tax
eﬀects to account for the January eﬀect, but to a substantial extent by publication dates of
annual reports.
The drop in NAV premia during the ﬁrst two years cannot be explained directly by
economic causes but has only small explanatory power. One likely reason why we observe
decreasing premia is a market mechanism when participants learn about management ability,
as proposed by Berk and Stanton (2007). Cash holdings can proxy for a fund’s investment
degree, which should provide some information about successful or unsuccessful portfolio
acquisitions. The fund’s investment degree has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on premia, which casts
doubt on managerial ability being the only explanation for declining premia. Variables
related to investor sentiment, on the other hand, oﬀer some insight into cross-sectional and
time-series properties of premia. Premia that are 10% lower than in closed-end mutual funds
across the board could be an indication of higher noise trader risk in listed private equity.
Sensitivity to small-cap indices and proxies for hot markets lends further support to the
investor sentiment hypothesis.
We ﬁnd a positive relation between the fund’s bid-ask spread and premia. Surprisingly,
infrequently traded funds have exceptionally high premia. Private equity fund valuations
seem to depend on credit markets, since premia are inversely related to the long-term credit
spread between government and corporate bonds. Moreover, premia are higher in funds with
low systematic risk, which suggests that systematic risk is not fully reﬂected in net asset
values. Another new eﬀect in listed private equity funds is the apparent underperformance
of buyout funds following their IPO. Buyout funds exhibit premia that are 10–11% lower
than premia in other funds, which is almost entirely attributable to poor stock performance
over their ﬁrst few years of trading.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review theories
explaining fund premia and account for the speciﬁcs of private equity funds. We motivate the
empirical analysis by combining theories from the closed-end fund literature with empirical
phenomena in private equity funds. In section 3, we provide detailed information on private
equity net asset values and variables used to estimates premia. In Section 4, we discuss the
results on the predictability of fund returns and fund premia and their implications. Section
5 contains a summary and conclusions.
2 Premia in (private equity) funds
Several theories have been put forward to explain the diﬀerence between NAV and market
price of a listed fund. On the one hand, the extant literature focuses on closed-end funds
that invest in securities. The description as a “closed-end fund puzzle” in the literature
highlights the diﬃculty of investigating NAV premia in these vehicles. On the other hand,
there are private equity-speciﬁc explanations, which take account of the fact that private
equity funds invest in unlisted companies.
The closed-end fund puzzle
Most of the theories dealing with NAV premia concern closed-end mutual funds, which
invest only in securities. The fact that these funds are traded at premia to NAV is even
more surprising, since such premia should be eliminated by arbitrage in perfect markets.
Closed-end investment funds are usually issued with a premium of up to 10%. Within
a few months, they trade at a discount. If the fund is converted into an open-end fund
(open-ending), merged with an open-end fund, liquidated, or if the fund’s portfolio is sold
as a whole, the fund price rises and the discount vanishes (Brauer (1984), Brickley and
Schallheim (1985), Kadapakkam et al. (2005)). We discuss the relevant theories trying to
explain the closed-end fund puzzle and highlight the similarities to listed private equity.
4Management fees
Several scholars have proposed theories why management fees of a fund should correlate with
NAV premia. Their results are, nevertheless, contradictory. Boudreaux (1973) argues that
fees might imply a NAV discount, if the fund’s charges are too high. Malkiel (1977) ﬁnds
no signiﬁcant relationship between fund returns or NAV premium and fees. Ammer (1990),
however, shows that the fees usually charged by UK funds explain the discounts well. His
model is criticized by Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999), because it neither explains the
variance of NAV premia in diﬀerent types of closed-end funds nor the variance in diﬀerent
countries. Lee et al. (1991) argue that fees are not responsible for the large ﬂuctuations in
premia, since they are typically calculated as a ﬁxed percentage of NAV. Thus the present
value of future fees varies mainly because of changing interest rates. According to their
study, there is no correlation between NAV premia and interest rates and thus not with
management fees. Furthermore, they state that fees cannot explain why closed-end funds
typically start with a premium. Kumar and Noronha (1992) use a larger dataset than Malkiel
(1977). Taking account of control variables, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between NAV
premia and fees. The small part of total variance explained by their regression suggests that
there may be other determining factors.
Management fees in private equity funds are usually determined as a ﬁxed percentage
of net assets as well. All arguments put forward to explain closed-end mutual fund premia
should therefore carry over to private equity funds.
Managerial ability and performance persistence
The theory of managerial ability posits that many closed-end funds have higher costs than the
expertise of investment managers could justify. Shares of those funds should therefore trade
at discounts while oﬀering comparably low returns (Dimson and Minio-Kozerski, 1999). Both
Malkiel (1977) and Thompson (1978) ﬁnd no evidence for this hypothesis in their analysis.
Going a step further, this theory suggests that a large NAV discount is followed by low
5future NAV returns (Dimson and Minio-Kozerski, 1999). According to Chay (1992) and
Chay and Trzcinka (1999), there is a signiﬁcant correlation between high discounts and low
future NAV returns. Lee et al. (1990) as well as Pontiﬀ (1995) do not ﬁnd this correlation
in their analyses. They demonstrate the opposite, namely that large NAV discounts lead to
better future NAV returns. In the most recent model involving managerial ability, Berk and
Stanton (2007) argue that discounts change over time as investors change their beliefs about
the manager’s ability. If managers cannot be ﬁred, poor managerial performance leads
to discounts. Premia are short-lived, because managers learn about their above-average
performance and negotiate a pay increase.
Taking previous returns as an indicator of the management’s skills in closed-end funds,
future NAV returns could be inferred from past observed NAV returns. Premia and discounts
could be explained by this performance persistence. Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001) ana-
lyze British closed-end funds but ﬁnd no evidence for the existence of performance persistence
in their data. Bleaney and Smith (2003) consider the relationship between past returns and
NAV premia. They examine closed-end funds in the US and UK that invest either in bonds
or stocks. Past returns are shown to have a positive impact on NAV premia, but only in
equity funds. The performance persistence explanation should also apply to listed private
equity. Kaplan and Schoar (2005), for example, show that it exists at least for traditional
non-listed private equity funds.
Private beneﬁts
If closed-end funds can be opened or liquidated, discounts should tend to zero. However, if
managers own very little of the fund, they do not beneﬁt substantially from opening the fund,
but would run a risk of losing their job. Therefore, managers resist open-ending proposals
and discounts persist. Larger managerial stock ownership should lead to an incentive to open
the fund and to declining discounts. Barclay et al. (1993) ﬁnd exactly the opposite relation.
The greater the managerial stock ownership in closed-end funds, the larger are the discounts
6to net asset value. The average discount for funds with blockholders is 14%, whereas the
average discount for funds without blockholders is only 4%. They argue that blockholders
receive private beneﬁts such as management fees or payments for ﬁnancial research that do
not accrue to other shareholders. Therefore, they veto open-ending proposals to preserve
these beneﬁts. The situation in listed private equity funds is somewhat more complicated.
While venture capital trusts generally allow the fund’s dissolution by shareholder resolution,
shareholder (or unitholder) rights diﬀer in funds with a partnership structure. Limited
partners in these funds typically have no right to terminate and dissolve the fund (e.g.
KKR Private Equity Investors). We suspect that the legal structure has an inﬂuence on
private beneﬁts extraction and may interact with the proportion of block ownership.
Tax timing
Following Constantinides (1984), capital gains tax can be reduced by skillfully timed pur-
chases and sales of shares. According to this theory, investors forgo their chance to minimize
taxes through managing their portfolio by investing in externally managed funds. If investors
replicate the fund’s portfolio instead, they have better control over their tax payments (Kim,
1994). Brickley et al. (1991) support this theory with their ﬁndings. Kim (1994) shows that
tax issues have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the NAV premium of closed-end funds. Tax tim-
ing, however, cannot explain why funds are occasionally traded at a premium. Contrary to
investment funds, LPE funds invest in rather illiquid assets that cannot be bought and sold
as easily as stocks. The replication argument does not hold, since there is no precise control
of tax payments possible.
Country funds and market segmentation
Closed-end funds that invest in a speciﬁc country or a particular region outside their home
country are called country funds (Charitou et al., 2006). The theory is that restrictions on
direct foreign investment are a possible explanation for NAV premia (Dimson and Minio-
7Kozerski, 1999). Bonser-Neal et al. (1990) test whether there is a correlation between an-
nouncements of changes in international investment restrictions and changes in NAV premia.
In four out of ﬁve funds they ﬁnd a reduction in premia whenever a liberalization of invest-
ment restrictions is announced. The average premium reduction is 6.8%. A study by Malkiel
(1977), however, shows no signiﬁcant correlation between the proportion of foreign shares in
the fund portfolio and its NAV premium. Country eﬀects cannot explain the up to 100%
premia of country funds which invested in Germany during the reuniﬁcation, since Germany
is a free market without investment barriers (Hardouvelis et al., 1993). This theory is hardly
applicable for listed private equity funds, since private equity funds with an explicit country
focus do not exist yet. Nevertheless, the German example shows the overreactions which
may occur in the market.
Low sales incentives
Malkiel (1977) points out that investors usually do not buy mutual funds. They are rather
sold to investors by brokers, but brokers sell those products that promise the highest com-
mission. Open-end funds usually pay higher commissions. According to Pratt (1966), this is
the reason for an imbalance of sales eﬀorts between open and closed funds. NAV discounts
are thus caused by a weaker demand for closed-end funds. Weiss (1989) adds that the higher
NAV premium at the moment of listing could be due to higher sales commissions in IPOs
of closed-end funds. There is no reason to believe that sales eﬀorts are higher or lower for
LPE funds than for other closed-end funds, but the overall eﬀect is hard to measure, since
there are no LPE funds comparable to open-end investment funds.
Investor sentiment
Because the previously mentioned theories cannot suﬃciently explain NAV discounts, the
rationality of the market is called into question. A visible sign of this irrationality could be
decreasing NAV discounts in times of bull markets and declining premia when stock prices
8are falling. Zweig (1973) argues that premia in closed-end funds mirror the expectations of
private investors. De Long et al. (1990) investigate the impact of these investors and the
possibility to reduce premia by arbitrage. They suggest the existence of two diﬀerent groups
of investors: rational and irrational investors. Rational investors have unbiased expectations
of future returns, but irrational investors’ predictions are systematically biased in either
direction. Rational investors are assumed risk averse and having ﬁnite investment horizons.
Because of their unpredictable behavior, irrational investors prevent rational investors from
eliminating premia by arbitrage. If irrational investors expect positive stock returns and
drive the stock price up, future expectations by irrational investors could be even higher,
thus making an arbitrage strategy partially infeasible. If a rational investor pursuing such a
strategy cannot hold his position any longer, he must liquidate it at a loss. Fear of this loss
should discourage at least investors that have a short investment horizon from arbitrage.
According to this theory, the reason for the existence of NAV premia is that irrational
investors directly cause deviations of market value and NAV and indirectly lead to higher
discounts or lower premia. Market price inﬂations on their own cause market values to
deviate from NAV in closed-end funds because of infeasible arbitrage.
In addition to this direct but symmetric eﬀect, there is a second, indirect reason for
discounts caused by noise trader risk. It is not due to the general pessimism of irrational
investors that closed-end funds are traded at a discount most of the time. Noise traders
rather induce discounts because of a non-predictable risk of stochastically acting irrational
investors (Lee et al., 1991). Investors wanting to sell their investment in ﬁnite time have to be
compensated for this noise trader risk, resulting in NAV discounts. Note that both rational
and irrational investors are aﬀected by this additional risk. In this way, irrational investors
with unpredictable changing return expectations cause stochastic changes in the demand for
the shares of closed-end funds, which in turn lead to stochastic changes in the NAV premia.
Lee et al. (1991) support this theory with their analysis based on the similar ownership
structures of closed-end funds and small listed companies and show a high correlation of
9NAV premia and stock returns of small companies.
There are, however, conﬂicting results. Ammer (1990) compares the closed-end funds in
the US with the closed-end funds in the UK. He concludes that in both countries similarly
high NAV premia can be observed, although British funds have a much higher proportion
of institutional investors (which is 70–75% during the time period Ammer studies). Since
institutional investors are seen as rational, this ﬁnding contradicts the investor sentiment
theory. According to Lee et al. (1991), there is suﬃcient evidence that shares of closed-
end funds are owned and traded to a large extent by irrational investors. They estimate
the proportion of irrational investors in closed-end funds much higher than their share in
the fund’s portfolio companies. In her study of 64 funds investing in stocks or bonds, Weiss
(1989) shows that three months after an IPO only 3.5% of all outstanding shares of a closed-
end fund are held by institutional investors. The proportion of small and possibly irrational
investors is presumably high in listed private equity funds. We can safely assume that their
share of the fund’s individual portfolio companies is much lower, since funds typically own
large stakes in unlisted portfolio companies. Consequently, even listed funds can be aﬀected
by noise trading and investor sentiment.
Private equity-related explanations
In addition to explanations focusing on mutual funds and the closed-end fund puzzle, there
are several explanations of NAV premia which apply to LPE-speciﬁc characteristics. These
are the dependence on credit markets in buyout funds, illiquidity of portfolios and listed
funds, stale pricing and the J-Curve eﬀect.
Dependency on credit markets
Private equity transactions and predominantly those in the buyout sector typically involve
large amounts of debt. Between 1990 and 2006, the average equity contribution in buyout
transactions was constantly about 30% of transaction value (Guo et al., 2008). Although it
10is not immediately clear how changes in the cost of debt aﬀect equity valuations, two direct
mechanisms that work in LPE are conceivable. Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2009) argue that
private equity funds may take advantage of systematic mispricings in the debt and equity
markets. When the cost of debt is relatively too low compared to an appropriate level,
private equity funds can arbitrage or beneﬁt from the diﬀerence by overleveraging. A similar
argument is put forward by Baker and Wurgler (2000) and Baker et al. (2003) for public
companies. The validity of this argument, however, relies on market frictions which cause a
segmentation of debt and equity markets.
Axelson et al. (2009) propose a diﬀerent hypothesis based on the observation that private
equity ﬁrms pursue large transactions relative to their fund sizes. Private equity ﬁrms might
be constrained in the amount of equity they can invest in a given deal. Therefore, they must
use leverage to fund their investments. Both theories imply a dependence on credit markets.
Based on Kaplan and Stein’s (1993) observation that overly favorable terms from high yield
bond investors could have fueled the 1980s buyout wave, Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2009) ﬁnd
a cyclicity in debt levels. They also document lower debt levels of about 30% in the second
buyout wave from 2005 through mid-2007 compared to 10–15% during the ﬁrst wave in the
80s, which they interpret as evidence for Kaplan and Stein’s argument that debt investors
might have been too optimistic. More transactions should be undertaken by LPE funds if
interest levels are unusually low. Excess value creation by funds during these periods could
be anticipated by fund investors, which in turn increases NAV premia.
Liquidity
Liquidity can play a role on two levels. On one hand, it is important to investigate whether
the portfolio companies’ liquidity have an inﬂuence on the fund’s NAV premium. On the
other hand, the liquidity of the fund itself might aﬀect premia. Lee et al. (1990) show that
the liquidity of the securities the fund holds cannot be responsible for the NAV discount in
investment funds, because only a few funds have illiquid securities in their portfolio. LPE
11funds, however, mostly hold illiquid shares in portfolio companies. Cherkes et al. (2008)
ﬁnd that closed-end funds that hold illiquid securities are traded at higher premia. They
justify this by the additional liquidity these funds oﬀer their investors compared to direct
investments in these portfolio companies. While the funds’s stock is listed on an exchange,
shares in the portfolio companies are highly illiquid. Since the illiquidity of an investment is
not taken into account when calculating the NAV, investors of such a fund pay an additional
liquidity premium. Note that this argument is directly opposed to the arbitrage argument
that premia should be lower if the liquidity of the fund’s underlying portfolio is high and
arbitrage strategies are thus easier to implement. On the fund level, Datar et al. (1998)
and Chordia et al. (2001) show that the illiquidity of an investment is generally related to
a higher rate of return, as investors want to be compensated for the higher risk in illiquid
investments. Many LPE vehicles are rather small and illiquid. Thus, the illiquidity both at
the level of the fund as well as on the level of the portfolio companies might have an impact
on NAV premia.
Stale pricing
The quality of net asset values is highly dependent on the choice of parameters and the
method used for their calculation. Therefore, a PE fund or the management company can
act with relatively high ﬂexibility in pricing those portfolio companies for which there is no
market price available (Anson, 2002). Since many PE ﬁrms accept the International Private
Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Guidelines developed by the industry organizations
AFIC, BVCA and EVCA and based on the notion of fair value, valuation methods are largely
the same across funds. However, many free parameters can be chosen at the ﬁrm’s discretion.
Many management companies are reluctant to change valuations in the absence of value-
determining events such as a change of ownership. There can be long periods without such
events, which can lead to NAVs containing less and less current information. Whenever the
net asset value does not contain all available information, this situation is called stale pricing.
12This leads to a delay between net asset value and observable market value. Therefore, the
NAV will only occasionally coincide with the market value of portfolio companies measured
by the hypothesized transaction value on a free market.
An inconsistency of NAV and market value or lagged book values can also be caused by
managed pricing (Anson, 2002). The management company has certain leeway in calculating
NAVs that can be exploited in the way most useful to fund management, that is, fast
appreciation and slow depreciation of NAVs to boost performance-related compensation.
Those fair values which are based on international valuation guidelines could be biased due
to stale pricing. Since the guidelines advocate rapid depreciation to ensure conservative
valuation, managed pricing should rather play a minor role.
Stale pricing and managed pricing are no longer a problem as soon as the portfolio
company is sold and the investment is realized by the fund. The ﬁnal return could be
observed at this point in time. Emery (2003) analyzes quarterly NAV returns by regressing
them on stock index returns and ﬁnds a coeﬃcient of determination of 35% when using
NASDAQ returns as an independent variable and 56% when using lagged NASDAQ returns.
These results suggest a delay in the adjustment of net asset values to new information about
portfolio companies. When using annual rather than quarterly data, the lag eﬀect is less
pronounced. However, Emery does not explore whether the delay is caused by stale pricing
or managed pricing.
Anson (2002) ﬁnds a similar lag structure between NAV returns and stock index returns.
In addition, he tests whether the delays are attributable to stale pricing or managed pricing.
He examines how fast NAVs appreciate in rising stock markets and depreciate in bear mar-
kets. Managed pricing should be indicated by quickly appreciating and slowly depreciating
NAVs. He notes that appreciation occurs slower than depreciation, which is in line with the
international guidelines on valuation but contrary to NAV-based incentive schemes. Since
listed funds employ the same business model as traditional private equity funds and their
portfolio companies are valued according to the same standards, results should be similar
13for listed funds. In listed funds, however, it is possible to construct incentive schemes based
on the stock price, which should reduce managed pricing to some extent.
The J-Curve eﬀect
A well established empirical phenomenon is the J-shaped relationship between a fund’s age
and its lifetime NAV return (see Phalippou and Gottschlag (2009), Kaplan and Schoar
(2005), Artus and Teiletche (2004), Kaserer and Diller (2004)). Reported net asset values
of most funds drop during the ﬁrst few years and grow steadily until the end of the fund’s
lifetime. Several explanations can account for this phenomenon. First, management fees that
are not oﬀset by realized proﬁts during the ﬁrst years can push NAV below par. This eﬀect
is even more pronounced in funds where management fees are calculated as a percentage
of committed capital and not paid-in capital. Second, most investments are made at the
beginning of the fund’s lifetime. Therefore, the majority of investment costs accrue over
this time. Finally, the J-curve can be the result of asymmetric depreciation policies. Many
PE ﬁrms depreciate aggressively if investments turn out worse than expected but write up
only if the portfolio company is sold or some other valuation event occurs. This creates a
downward pressure on net asset values during the ﬁrst few months or years when no such
value-determining event occurs. This pressure can be ampliﬁed, if the fund management is
able to identify underperforming portfolio companies earlier than outperforming ones.
All these eﬀects also apply to listed private equity with the exception of management fees,
where the magnitude of the J-curve is supposedly lower than in traditional PE funds. Listed
funds are usually paid in at once and thus no discrepancy between committed capital and
paid-in capital can exist. More than half of the European institutional investors surveyed
by LPEQ believe that listed private equity oﬀers less management fees compared to limited
partnership private equity and an attractive way to invest in private equity after the “J-
curve”, avoiding low returns on investment in initial periods (Cumming et al., 2010).
In eﬃcient stock markets, price changes reﬂect changes in the expectations of shareholders
14in net cash ﬂows available for distribution to the shareholders and also in the interest rate
used to discount future cash ﬂows. Since the J-Curve eﬀect is well known, it should be taken
into account in rational capital markets and should thus have no impact on share price
movements. If the fund’s NAV shows a J-Curve eﬀect but the share price does not, then
NAV discounts should depend on the fund’s age. This theory could, if conﬁrmed, explain
only a small part of NAV discounts shortly after the fund’s IPO and does not explain premia
at the IPO or late in the fund’s lifetime.
3 Data and methodology
Net asset values and premia
Fund data were compiled from several sources. Net asset values per share between 1992
and 2008 were collected from the funds’ ﬁnancial reports. Share prices were obtained from
Datastream. Practitioners usually deﬁne a fund’s premium as the ratio of the fund’s price
per share to the book value of their portfolio per share minus one. In this paper, we compute
premia as the natural logarithm of price to net asset value per share. Since one ratio can
be transformed into the other, we do not lose information but are able to specify regression
models correctly. A fund’s premium can be expressed as PREMt = ln(Pt/NAVt) where Pt is
the fund’s price per share and NAVt is deﬁned as the fund’s net asset value or, equivalently,
book value of equity per share. We were able to collect 1727 premia from 100 funds, not
all of which can be analyzed in all models due to missing data on covariates. Our sample
comprises 79 ordinary funds and 21 listed private equity funds of funds (FoF) that invest in
traditional private equity funds. Since funds of funds turn out to behave similarly to directly
investing funds, we do not treat them as special, but address relevant FoF issues below. Most
funds (64) are headquartered in the UK, 11 are based in the US, 20 in continental Europe
and 5 in other countries.
Figure 1 shows the average premium over time. Most observations are from the last 5
15years when many funds went public. Funds usually report NAVs quarterly, but sometimes
change reporting frequency or business year. 48 funds report more than 3 NAVs per year
on average, 26 report more often than twice per year. Our data thus have an unbalanced
panel structure with gaps. We record NAVs in March, June, September and December. If
business years are oﬀ by on leading or lagging month, NAVs are treated as being reported in
the nearest quarter (for example, if the fund reports in May, we record this NAV in June).
79 funds report at the end of the quarter, 12 one month before and 9 one month later.
[Insert ﬁgure 1 about here]
Covariates
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the net asset value premia and covariates. The average
ratio of NAV to market value is 84.2%, which corresponds to an average premium of -20.7%.
One NAV below zero is observed but is excluded from further analyses when taking logs.
85.7% of all premia are below zero, only 3.1% are greater than 20%. The average fund age
is 6.6 years, which documents the recent growth in this asset class.
[Insert table 1 about here]
• Cash / Total Assets: The funds’ cash position and total assets in each quarter are
taken from Worldscope and augmented by ﬁgures from the funds’ ﬁnancial reports.
We deﬁne the cash position as cash and cash equivalents to total assets. We also
compute a cash position relative to market capitalization but do not use it to explain
16premia. Since most of this measure’s variation is due to changes in market value,
including it in a regression for premia would cause spurious correlation. The average
cash position is 11.3% with a median of 5.8%. Compared to market value, funds hold
18.0% cash on average (Median 8.4%).
• Bid-ask spread (Log): Bid-ask spreads are calculated for each fund as its share price’s
bid-ask spread averaged over each quarter. The average bid-ask spread is 2%. Two
implausible negative values could not be veriﬁed, but are excluded when taking logs.
• Trading days (Log): In each quarter, we count the number of days Datastream reports
a trading volume for and take its natural log. The average number of trading days is
41, but most funds traded on 56 or more days each quarter. The variable that enters
the regression is the percentage of trading days in each quarter in logs.
• Age (Log): At the end of each quarter, each fund’s age is calculated as the natural
logarithm of the number of years from its IPO date.
• Institutional ownership (Log): Ownership data is obtained from Thomson Financial
for the years 1997 to 2008. The Thomson ONE Ownership database reports the in-
stitutional ownership for equities at the end of each year based on various sources,
such as 13(f) ﬁlings by institutions or mutual fund data. We sum all shares held by
investors other than individual investors to obtain the institutional ownership fraction
and take logs. Average institutional ownership is 32%. Two funds have more than
100% institutional ownership in one year, which could not be resolved.
• Ownership concentration (Log): To measure the extent of blockholdings, we construct a
Herﬁndahl index for each fund-year from the ownership data obtained from Thomson
ONE Ownership for our sample. This measure does not only include institutional
investors but also individual ones. Holdings in listed private equity funds are diversiﬁed
to a large extent, indicated by a median Herﬁndahl index of 0.017.
17• Beta: Systematic risk is estimated by a time-series regression with Dimson (1979)
betas over a one-year rolling window. We use this variable to proxy for systematic
business risk associated with portfolio companies. Based on the international Capital
Asset Pricing Model, the equation for the regression is given by
Rt = α +
7 X
k=0
βkMt−k + γ1GBPt + γ2EURt + γ3JPYt + ǫt, (1)
Beta is the sum of βk. Rt and Mt−k are the respective observed logarithmic (excess)
weekly index and market returns at time t and t-k, whereas k corresponds to the
respective lag, α, β and γ are the slope coeﬃcients and ǫt is an error term. Asset and
market returns are in US dollars. We include seven lagged market returns, since this
number of lags turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant for equally weighted indices of
listed private equity (see Lahr and Herschke (2009)). GBP, EUR and JPY are the
weekly log returns of currency portfolios to account for exchange rate ﬂuctuations and
movements in local interest rates. They are constructed as (excess) returns on short-
term deposits denominated in local currency and measured in the reference currency.
All returns are continuously compounded. Since market return autocorrelations are
relatively small compared to autocorrelations in our LPE indices, we exclude leading
market returns to avoid look-ahead bias. The risk-free rate of return was estimated by
averaging the monthly averages of three month Treasury bill returns over the observed
period and taking logs.
• Management fee: Private equity funds usually charge two types of fees. Management
fees typically are a ﬁxed percentage of NAV whereas performance-related fees can
depend on income or capital gains. Performance fees of 20% of NAV gains combined
with an 8% hurdle rate are most common in our sample. Since diﬀerent performance
fee provisions across funds cannot easily be concentrated in one variable, we choose
to retain only nominal management fees as a covarite. Management fees range from
180.4% to 3.5%. The median fee is 1.8%.
• Market and small cap indices: The concurrent quarterly MSCI World index return
is used to control for the market risk factor in equity markets. To test the investor
sentiment theory, the FTSE Small Cap, DJ Stoxx Small and MSCI US Small Cap
index returns are included for the UK, Europe and the US, respectively. Because of
high collinearity, we construct a small-cap factor from these indices.
• Commitments: Cash inﬂows to private equity funds may well indicate hot markets ac-
cording to the money-chasing-deals argument (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) and there-
fore inﬂuence premia. We obtain quarterly worldwide fund commitments in U.S. Dol-
lars from Thomson VentureXpert to measure both level and changes in fund commit-
ments.
• IPO volume: A second variable to proxy for investor sentiment in hot markets is
the volume of international initial public stock oﬀerings in U.S. Dollars. We obtain
quarterly worldwide IPO volume from Thomson SDC.
• Interest rates and spread: We decompose long-term interest rates on corporate debt
into 10-year government bond yield and the spread between long-term government and
corporate bonds. UK and US interest rates are represented by their respective gov-
ernment bond yield, continental European interest rates are approximated by German
10-year benchmark bond yields.
• Fund focus: To account for possibly diﬀerent business risk and organizational struc-
tures, we separate funds according to their stage focus. We only distinguish between
venture funds (41) and buyout funds (38) because of the limited number of funds. The
21 funds of funds in our sample constitute a third category.
19Estimation
Net asset value premia in listed private equity funds show considerable autocorrelation at
lag one. We therefore employ estimation techniques that account for this autocorrelation.
Returns in tables 3 and 6 are estimated by pooled OLS with inference using Newey-West
standard errors. A more direct method to deal with autocorrelation is to adjust the variables
previous to the estimation, which is done in tables 4 and 8. Variables are ﬁrst purged of
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation by a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. After that, we use the
GLS method by Baltagi and Wu (1999) to handle unbalanced panel data. To identify
coeﬃcients for variables that are constant within each panel, the Baltagi and Wu random
eﬀects estimator is employed. We also report ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for comparison for some
models.
Collinearity among independent variables can make it hard to assign eﬀects to speciﬁc
variables. Spurious signiﬁcance or no signiﬁcance at all could be the result of negatively or
positively correlated variables, respectively. There is a large amount of common variation
among the market index returns, interest rates, and (lagged) interest spreads. We try to
overcome these issues by constructing factors from groups of variables by performing factor
analyses and using the common factors in regressions instead of the original variables. Small
capitalization index returns for U.S., U.K., and continental European stocks are aggregated
into a small-cap factor. We also construct factors for interest rates on government bonds
and for yield spreads between government and corporate bonds in these markets.
4 Empirical results
We record the ﬁrst observation for one fund two days after its IPO. The average premium
for this day is -2.58%. If extrapolated linearly from this ﬁrst observation, the IPO premium
is -2.5% (see table 2 and ﬁgure 2). This is considerably less than the premia reported for
U.K. and U.S. closed-end funds. The average investment trust issue is quoted at an eﬀective
20premium of 5.72% above its net asset value at the end of the ﬁrst day of trading (Levis and
Thomas, 1995). U.S. stocks still trade at 4.8% premium 5 weeks after the IPO (Weiss, 1989).
Considering an initial return of -6.48% over the ﬁrst 30 days, as reported by Weiss (1989),
U.S. stocks sell at an even higher premium. According to Lee et al. (1991), ﬁrst day premia
are generally attributed to investor sentiment, which issuing ﬁrms are able to use to their
advantage. If ﬁrst day premia occur in hot issue markets due to positive investor sentiment,
we observe less irrational behavior in listed private equity funds. This argument must be
taken with a grain of salt, however, since not premia per se may be seen as an indication of
investor sentiment but rather the large drop in premia after a fund’s IPO, as we will argue
below.
[Insert ﬁgure 2 about here]
After the ﬁrst slightly negative premium on the ﬁrst trading day, premia decrease to
the long-run average of -21%. The drop in premia is fairly linear and reaches its bottom
after 2–2.5 years as depicted in ﬁgure 3. Weiss (1989) ﬁnds that within 24 weeks of trading,
closed-end equity funds in the U.S. trade at a signiﬁcant average discount of 10.02%. Levis
and Thomas (1995) ﬁnd that after 200 trading days, equity funds in the U.K. fall in value
by 5%. The qualitative behavior of premia is thus very similar to closed-end funds but
displays a time pattern like in traditional private equity funds where returns measured by
IRRs usually turn around after 2–3 years and break even after 5–6 years. However, the
pattern is actually reversed compared to what we should expect if the J-curve phenomenon
was driving premia. If NAV returns were low over the ﬁrst quarters but shares earned some
risk-adjusted return, premia should rise ﬁrst and then remain at an equilibrium. We ﬁnd
no correlation between NAV returns and age but higher stock returns in older funds. This
suggests that the age eﬀect is driven by stock returns rather than net asset values.
21[Insert ﬁgure 3 about here]
[Insert table 2 about here]
An explanation for discounts in line with Berk and Stanton’s (2007) management ability
hypothesis is that the market needs some time to learn about the management’s quality.
This argument works for private equity funds, since it takes much longer in private equity
funds to invest the IPO proceeds than in closed-end mutual funds. If, for example, manage-
ment ability can be assessed based on the acquisitions during this initial investment period
rather than the portfolio’s subsequent performance, the largest changes in premia should be
observed in this early post-IPO period. Consistent with this explanation, premia in venture
capital funds take about four years to settle whereas premia in buyout funds and funds of
funds reach their long-term average two years after their IPO. Initial changes in fund premia
could therefore be an indication of managerial ability.
A post-IPO decline in premia can be explained by both investor sentiment and managerial
ability. While consequences are similar, causes and mechanism of both hypotheses could
hardly be more diﬀerent. Positive investor sentiment, and therefore high premia, should be
observed in markets when other indicators for investor sentiment, such as the volume of initial
public oﬀerings, are also high. Movements in premia due to discoveries of managerial ability
should be correlated with indicators of information ﬂow, such as a fund’s investment degree.
If premia reﬂect fund investors’ assessment of managerial ability, it should be reﬂected in
returns. Berk and Stanton (2007) point out that today’s premium should be related to past
returns, since high NAV and stock returns indicate high ability. Premia should also be related
to future NAV returns but not to future stock returns, because better managers generate
22higher NAV returns relative to the fees charged. These arguments hold only if funds have a
limited life. Since most listed private equity funds do not have speciﬁc wind-up provisions
in their charters, bounded premia would require stock returns and NAV returns net of costs
to match in the long run. If funds have inﬁnite lives, premia would rather reﬂect barriers to
arbitrage or other variables than managerial ability. We therefore test the relation between
returns and premia empirically before examining the determinants of premia.
Return predictability
Listed private equity NAV premia predict future stock performance in almost all of our sub-
samples (see tables 3 and 4). The negative relation is stable across diﬀerent speciﬁcations
and independent from the Fama-French HML factor.
In rational markets, sensitivity of returns to book-to-market ratios represents some ﬁ-
nancial risk associated with high (or low) book-to-market ﬁrms. The book-to-market eﬀect
is a well documented phenomenon across diﬀerent markets. Fama and French (1992, 1993,
1998) document a strong positive relation between average cross-sectional returns and book-
to-market equity. Empirical studies ﬁnd that book-to-market ratios are inversely related to
future ﬁrm performance (Fama and French (2004), Fama and French (1995)) and growth
(Lakonishok et al., 1994) and are positively related to leverage (Chen and Zhang, 1998).
Petkova and Zhang (2005) show that the value premium itself tends to covary positively
with the expected market risk premium. These results suggest that high book-to-market
ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially distressed than low book-to-market ﬁrms, and therefore at least
some of the documented stock performance is an artifact of expected returns for ﬁnancial
risk factors (Piotroski, 2007).
Contrary to these explanations, Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the subsequent re-
turns to the book-to-market strategy represent a reversal of past valuation errors. The
predominant ﬁnding in closed-end funds is a negative correlation between fund premia and
future returns, which is the opposite of the negative relation between book-to-market ratios
23and returns. Pontiﬀ (1995) ﬁnds that funds with 20% discounts have expected twelve-month
returns that are 6% greater than nondiscounted funds (0.7% per month). Thompson (1978)
ﬁnds that annual contrarian strategies based on this ﬁnding yield abnormal risk-adjusted
returns of about 4% per year. Pontiﬀ (1995) attributes this correlation to premium mean-
reversion, not to anticipated future portfolio performance. Economically motivated expla-
nations such as bid-ask spread or tax considerations do not account for this eﬀect.
[Insert table 3 about here]
Results for listed private equity fund returns displayed in table 3 show both eﬀects.
Fund returns can be explained by the book-to-market factor but also by past premia. Funds
trading at a 20% discount yield a quarterly return 1.5% higher than those without such a
premium. The eﬀect is least in buyout funds and most pronounced in venture funds. Since
returns are autocorrelated at lag one (p < 0.05), we perform the same regressions on adjusted
variables and ﬁnd similar results for all sub-samples (see table 4).
[Insert table 4 about here]
Additionally, we observe a U-shaped seasonal pattern in returns. Quarterly returns are
highest in the ﬁrst quarter and lowest in the second and third (see table 3). This would
be a violation of market eﬃciency if no economic cause were to be found. In a three-factor
CAPM world, the January eﬀect in returns should disappear, if returns are regressed on
risk factors that also show this eﬀect (Fama and French, 1992). This is not the case in our
data. The seasonality is robust to alternative model speciﬁcations as shown in tables 4 and
245. Explanations of this “January eﬀect”, which are put forward in the literature, are mostly
tax-related.
[Insert table 5 about here]
Pontiﬀ (1995) argues that diﬀerent taxation of dividends and capital gains can cause a
transitional eﬀect on returns and premia. When stocks go ex-dividend, their prices fall by
an amount less than the dividend. This aﬀects both the fund and its portfolio. In periods
in which a fund collects dividends on its portfolio, its premium decreases, because its net
asset value increases. When the fund passes on these dividends to its shareholders, its stock
will decrease less than the drop in NAV, thus increasing the premium. There are several
diﬃculties with this argument in the context of listed private equity funds. First, higher
NAV returns in periods when the fund is collecting dividends depend on the fund’s ability to
revalue its portfolio according to the diﬀerence between dividends received and the change
of the portfolio company’s share price. This can be diﬃcult if there is no market price for
portfolio companies, as is the case with private equity funds. In regressions similar to the
ones shown in table 3, we do not ﬁnd a seasonality in NAV returns. Second, dividends
would have to be simply too large to account for the diﬀerence in returns, which is about
4% between the ﬁrst and third quarter.
The second explanation could be tax-loss-selling. This theory holds that at the end of the
year, investors sell stocks which have experienced losses to realize these losses and thereby
reduce their taxable income. Brauer and Chang (1990) document a “January eﬀect” in
closed-end funds, which they interpret as evidence of tax-loss selling. They show that fund
prices increase in January, although their net asset values do not. We also ﬁnd signiﬁcantly
higher January returns in listed private equity funds. However, tax-loss-selling does not
account for the surprisingly low returns in the second and third quarter.
25Bilo (2002, p.63) ﬁnds a similar return pattern in her sample of listed private equity funds,
investment companies and other organizational structures. Stock returns are highest in the
ﬁrst two quarters and below-average from July to December. She argues that information
about underlying portfolios is mainly disseminated by annual reports, which are published
within the ﬁrst few months of each year. Fund investors then use this information to update
their valuation. In private equity, there is usually no other way for investors to gain knowledge
about the fair value of the fund’s portfolio companies.
Such an eﬀect would suggest a fundamental diﬀerence of audited annual reports compared
to interim reports. The U-shaped pattern of returns can be explained to a large extent by
reporting dates. 47% of our sample funds report in the last quarter, 27% in the ﬁrst quarter
and 13% in the second and third quarter each. If report are published in the quarter following
the balance sheet date, we should expect impact on returns in the ﬁrst and second quarter,
which is exactly what we ﬁnd.
To conﬁrm this hypothesis, we construct a variable that measures the time distance of an
observation from the last reporting date. Tables 3, 4 and 5 reveal that stock returns of listed
private equity funds are 3.1% to 3.9% higher in quarters when annual reports are published.
Even if information was generated by annual reports only, their impact on returns should be
symmetrical. This pattern of returns thus indicates some informational ineﬃciency, whose
causes we can only speculate about.
Determinants of listed private equity premia
Premia and global equity markets seem to move together, as indicated by ﬁgure 1. While it
could be fruitful to regress premia on market indices, the diﬃculty of non-stationarity arises.
Premia are stationary over the medium term for economic reasons, but index levels have
no upper boundary. Our aim is to test cross-sectional as well as time-series properties of
premia. Econometric solutions to non-stationarity problems usually involve ﬁrst diﬀerencing
of dependent and independent variables. We follow this approach and include ﬁrst diﬀer-
26enced variables where appropriate to explain changes in premia. Unfortunately, variables
that are constant over time (most fund-speciﬁc attributes) drop out of the equation when
diﬀerencing. To keep these variables, we estimate models for premia levels explained by
levels of market indices. Although clearly not stationary over longer terms, market indices
might nevertheless be stationary over time periods spanning only a few years. Variables that
are almost integrated of order one are strongly autocorrelated, which must be taken into
account in estimation and considered carefully when interpreting results.
Regressions using diﬀerenced and original variables as shown in tables 7 and 8 yield
largely similar results.
[Insert table 7 about here]
The age eﬀect found in the descriptive analysis is also present in multivariate analyses.
During the ﬁrst year after the IPO, funds show a 9.9% above-average premium which declines
to 5.7% above the long-term average in the second year. This two-year adaptation period
might be caused by the long investment period of private equity funds, which go public
with a portfolio consisting almost entirely of cash that is invested in portfolio companies
over time. Cash levels can therefore act as a proxy for the fund’s investment degree. There
is, however, no inﬂuence of the fund’s investment degree on its premium in our data (see
model 3 in tables 7 and 8). If we construct a cash ratio based on market value instead of
total assets, we ﬁnd a negative relation between cash and premia where there should be a
positive one. Since market value enters the equation on both sides, the eﬀect is likely caused
by endogeneity. Although the age eﬀect can be explained by managerial ability (discovery
of ability over the ﬁrst few years) as well as investor sentiment (price deterioration after
hot issue markets), the missing relation between premia and the fund’s investment degree
challenge managerial ability as the sole explanation.
27Investor sentiment as an explanation for premia plays a dominant role in the literature
on closed-end fund discounts. Funds issued at premia and rising premia in hot markets as
well as a general discount on closed-end funds are all attributed to the presence of irrational
investors. We ﬁnd partial support for this hypothesis in listed private equity funds. Premia
are related to market indices, small-cap indices, IPO volume, and commitments to traditional
private equity funds. However, the age eﬀect cannot be explained entirely by these variables,
and ownership structure does not seem to determine NAV premia either.
Average discounts in listed private equity funds are similar in shape to the time pattern
observed in closed-end mutual funds. While U.K. and U.S. closed-end mutual funds are
issued at a premium, the average IPO premium in our sample is negative. This should not
be interpreted as a smaller sensitivity to investor sentiment, since premia are about 10%
lower over the funds’ lifetime, not just shortly after its IPO. If investor sentiment was a
driver of premia, they would be correlated with small-cap indices. If funds are issued when
investor sentiment is positive, the resulting decline in premia would simply be a consequence
of market timing. Any unexplained age eﬀects would then have to be attributed to some
other cause.
Movements in equity markets are strongly related to NAV premia in all subsamples and
all models. MSCI World returns are the last variable to lose signiﬁcance if the sample size is
reduced. If small-cap indices for U.K., U.S., and continental European markets added to the
regressions, they have no individual power in explaining premia (regressions not reported
here). A factor constructed from these indices is, however, signiﬁcantly but negatively cor-
related with premia. At the same time, the market index is signiﬁcant with the opposite
sign, which is an indication of collinearity (ρ = 0.63). We therefore construct a factor from
small-cap indices to eliminate collinearity between them. Residuals from regressions of this
small-cap factor on market returns capture the variation in small-cap stocks not already
incorporated in market returns. Signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for these small-cap residuals in our
results suggest the presence of investor sentiment in listed private equity funds.
28We use commitments to unlisted private equity funds and the volume of international
IPOs as proxies for hot markets that indicate positive investor sentiment. Coeﬃcients for
both variables are both statistically and economically signiﬁcant in most models. Despite
their common variation, fund commitments and IPO volume add individual explanatory
power to our models. Although IPO numbers of listed private equity funds follow the general
trend, adding these two sentiment indicators does not seem to reduce the age eﬀect.
[Insert table 8 about here]
Institutional ownership, which can also proxy for noise trader risk, does not seem to
determine premia. The concentration of ownership is similar, but also proxies for the poten-
tial of owners to extract private beneﬁts. Although there is some correlation with premia
(ρ=-10.5, p<0.01), we ﬁnd no inﬂuence on premia in a multivariate setting. Institutional
ownership and ownership concentration share a large part of their variation, which can lead
collinearity problems, if both are included in a model. A single factor constructed from
both variables becomes slightly signiﬁcant as shown in table 7. Ownership information is
not available for all funds in our sample, which leaves us in doubt about the inﬂuence of
ownership structures on NAV premia.
While independent indicate investor sentiment to some degree, simply the premium’s size
could reﬂect the greater importance of investor sentiment in private equity funds compared
to closed-end mutual funds. Average premia are about 10% lower than in closed-end mutual
funds over the funds’ lifetimes. It is unlikely that these larger discounts can be explained by
the illiquidity of the fund’s holdings. The opportunity to trade portfolios of illiquid assets
should rather be accompanied by higher premia as is the case in closed-end mutual funds that
oﬀer access to foreign (segmented) markets. Instead, lower premia in listed private equity
funds possibly are a sign of higher arbitrage costs. Most portfolios are not only held privately
29– which is the very nature of private equity – but are also majority-owned by the private
equity fund, making arbitrage almost impossible. Rational investors facing these obstacles
cannot easily buy the listed private equity vehicle at a discount and sell the portfolio. Noise
trader risk is thus ampliﬁed, which increases discounts.
We conclude that investor sentiment seems to inﬂuence premia, although decreasing post-
IPO premia cannot be explained entirely by changes in investor sentiment. If fund age is
excluded from the regressions, however, R2 drops by less than 0.5%. Albeit small, the
unexplained age eﬀect lends some support to the management ability hypothesis by Berk
and Stanton (2007).
Pontiﬀ (1995) ﬁnds a positive relation between bid-ask spreads and expected returns,
which is dominated by the even stronger ability of premia to predict returns. This eﬀect of
both variables predicting returns could be the result of collinearity between premia and bid-
ask spreads, which is indicated by our results in table 8. If low premia represent ﬁnancial risk
that is only in part explained by bid-ask spread, premia could be a more reliable predictor of
returns than bid-ask spreads. However, bid-ask spreads could still be the economic cause of
premia, as we propose here. This direction of causality seems more plausible than a causation
of bid-ask spread by premia or by a third unobserved variable.
As another proxy for liquidity, we include in our analysis the percentage of active trading
days within each quarter. The expected relation is positive, if illiquidity causes discounts.
However, we ﬁnd a negative relation across all model speciﬁcations in table 8. Although
bid-ask ratios and trading days are negatively correlated (ρ=-0.56), one of them remains
signiﬁcant with the same sign as before, if the other is excluded from the regression. It turns
out that the eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant if we exclude severely illiquid observations with less
than 5 trading days per quarter. If we assume that zero trades are data errors and impute
the sample average of 41 trading days instead, the eﬀect for trading days disappears. To
the contrary, the eﬀect does not disappear if we impute 4 trading days (4 days maximize
the signiﬁcance of trading activity). The negative trading activity eﬀect thus appears to be
30nonlinear and strongest in quarters with only a couple of trades. Adding a dummy variable
that measures if there are up to 15 trading days per quarter yields a small, but positive
coeﬃcient (b = 0.031), which is only partially signiﬁcant (p = 0.071). We do not ﬁnd a
reasonable explanation for this negative eﬀect of trading activity within our dataset, which
suggests that results might be due to data errors or an unobserved variable.
Interest rates have a mixed eﬀect on premia, whereas the yield spread between govern-
ment and corporate debt contributes inversely to NAV premia. We observe a positive relation
between U.K. long term interest rates and premia. Because interest rates are strongly cor-
related between U.S., U.K. and continental European markets, their common variation can
be used to construct a replacement variable by factor analysis. When used instead of indi-
vidual interest rates, the interest factor is signiﬁcant in models explaining premia levels (see
table 8). Changes in interest rates, however, are negatively related to changes in premia but
remain insigniﬁcant.
The eﬀect of yield spread on premia is consistently negative. This result could imply
that changes in spreads have a stronger inﬂuence on market prices than on net asset values.
Pontiﬀ and Schall (1998) provide an explanation built on arguments put forward by Ball
(1978) and Berk (1995). Berk reminds us that a ﬁrm’s market value does not cause its capital
cost to be high but that rising discount rates lead to a lower lower market capitalization.
Pontiﬀ and Schall argue that book value proxies for future cash ﬂows and therefore dividing
a cash ﬂow proxy by a concurrent market price produces a variable that is correlated with
future returns. This is because dividing an expected cash ﬂow proxy (net asset values in
our case) by a price level (market value) yields a discount rate proxy. This approach is very
general, since it holds whether or not discount rates are generated by a speciﬁc model or
are inﬂuenced by stochastic or irrational factors. However, Pontiﬀ and Schall’s explanation
depends on the ability of book value to proxy for cash ﬂow. Turning this argument around,
the common variation in premia and yield spread in our results supports the hypothesis that
book value proxies for cash ﬂow.
31It seems to be the diﬀerence in yield between corporate debt and government debt that
shows a relation to premia, not the interest level. This suggests that changes in interest
rates are reﬂected in both net asset values and market prices. Our result is consistent with
the hypotheses by Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2009) and Axelson et al. (2009) who suggest a
dependence of private equity valuations particularly on yields of high-yield bonds.
Moreover, we document an inverse relation between premia and systematic risk, repre-
sented by Dimson beta in an international capital asset pricing model. Since portfolio betas
are just the weighted sum of its assets’ betas, net asset values and fund prices should move
together. The diﬀerence between the two should therefore not depend on systematic risk.
The eﬀect we observe in our data is suggestive of mispricing of net asset values or fund prices.
The former is more likely because of the management’s discretionary power when estimating
net asset values. For high-beta funds, net asset values seem too high, and vice versa.
Further insights into the nature of fund premia might come from grouping funds according
to legal systems. In particular, private beneﬁts could be extracted more easily in some
jurisdictions than in others. We use the exchange which a fund’s stock is traded on to
distinguish between common law and other legal systems. There are 76 funds in common
law countries whose premia are about 10% higher on average. Since there are 25 venture
capital trusts in our sample that oﬀer tax advantages, we control for this fact, but ﬁnd no
diﬀerent results. This ﬁnding is consistent with the view that protection of investors in
publicly listed companies is higher in countries of English legal origin (La Porta et al., 1998).
[Insert table 6 about here]
Fund focus shows a surprisingly large eﬀect in our sample. Venture capital funds and funds
of funds have premia that are 10–11% higher than in buyout funds. Could it be that there
is less value creation in buyout funds? If funds are issued at net asset value, there must be
32either a faster appreciation of net asset values in buyout funds or a drop in fund prices after
the IPO. Interestingly, buyout funds start with a premium of 3.04%, whereas venture capital
funds and funds of funds are issued at premia of –6.85% and –6.64%, respectively. This
suggests that buyout fund prices depreciate even faster relative to their NAVs. We perform a
regression of fund returns on the usual risk factors and fund age and ﬁnd a negative abnormal
return for the ﬁrst year (see table 6). The sum of the year dummies is signiﬁcant at the
5%-level. There is no such eﬀect in venture capital fund or fund of funds returns. If not for
high investor sentiment, it remains a puzzle why investors should be willing to participate
in buyout fund IPOs under these circumstances.
In line with the arguments by Lee et al. (1991), we ﬁnd no correlation between manage-
ment fees and premia. It might be argued that fund of funds’ fees are double-layered because
of the fees charged both at the portfolio fund level and by the fund of funds. Nevertheless,
there is still no eﬀect if the average management fee of funds is added to the funds of funds’
fee.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the causes and consequences of discounts in listed private equity
(LPE) funds. LPE funds share characteristics of closed-end mutual funds and traditional
unlisted private equity funds and can therefore oﬀer insights into both. The purpose of
this paper is twofold: First, we test the hypotheses developed to solve the “closed-end fund
puzzle” against the newly established LPE asset class. Second, we improve the understanding
of premia in traditional private equity funds, whose market prices are typically unobservable.
In contrast to mutual funds, we ﬁnd that LPE funds do not trade at a premium immedi-
ately after their IPO. They start with a negative premium of -2.5% instead. This premium
takes much longer than in mututal funds – over 2 years – to adjust to the long-term average
of -21%. Premia predict future stock returns after controlling for the book-to-market factor.
33We interpret the negative correlation as mean reversion following Pontiﬀ (1995).
We ﬁnd a U-shaped seasonality in fund returns across diﬀerent investment styles, which
can neither be explained by diﬀerent taxation of dividends and capital gains nor by tax-
loss-selling. A substantial part of this pattern seems to be related to the fund’s ﬁscal year.
Returns are exceptionally high in quarters where annual reports are published, which is
puzzling, since tax reasons oﬀer no satisfactory explanation for the 3.5% return diﬀerential.
The fund’s cash divided by total asset can proxy for its investment degree, but shows no
relation to premia. If a fund’s investment degree conveys information about the quality of its
management by making it possible to judge the management by recent portfolio acquisitions,
the missing relation between cash holdings and premia casts doubt on the management
ability hypothesis. Investor sentiment, however, ﬁnds support in our results where proxies
for small-cap stocks and hot IPO markets become signiﬁcant.
We further conﬁrm the positive relation between the fund’s liquidity, measured by its
bid-ask spread, and premia. Surprisingly, infrequently traded funds have exceptionally high
premia. We ﬁnd evidence that some information about the fund’s portfolio is not reﬂected
in net asset values but in market prices. Fund valuations depend on the long-term credit
spread between government and corporate bonds. Premia are also higher in funds with low
systematic risk, which suggests that systematic risk is not fully reﬂected in net asset values.
This lends support to the hypothesis that net asset values proxy for future cash ﬂow, which,
if divided by discount rate proxies like beta or credit spread, yields a market price.
Another new eﬀect in listed private equity funds is the apparent under-performance of
buyout funds following their IPO. Buyout funds exhibit premia that are 10–11% lower than
premia in other funds, which is almost entirely attributable to poor stock performance over
the ﬁrst few years of the funds’ lifetime. These ﬁndings suggest that future research on fund
premia might beneﬁt from examining the drop in ﬁrst-year premia and the informational
content of private equity net asset values.
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Table 9: Correlation between premia and covariates
Figures are Pearson product-moment correlation coeﬃcients. P-values are in parentheses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 NAV premium (Ln)
2 Fund age (Ln) -0.157
(0.00)
3 Bid-ask spread (Ln) -0.057 -0.115
(0.02) (0.00)
4 Trading days (Ln) -0.078 0.161 -0.563
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5 Beta -0.142 0.057 -0.095 0.156
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
6 Common law 0.178 0.062 0.317 -0.288 -0.047
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
7 VCT 0.081 -0.065 0.599 -0.693 -0.088 0.324
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
8 Managment fee -0.015 -0.025 0.262 -0.263 -0.076 -0.071 0.419
(0.53) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
9 Cash / Total Assets 0.037 -0.273 0.087 -0.069 -0.019 0.009 -0.044 0.124
(0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.65) (0.03) (0.00)
10 Cash / Market value -0.099 -0.164 0.092 -0.030 -0.002 0.056 -0.035 0.140
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.91) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00)
11 Inst. Ownership (Ln) 0.030 0.122 -0.379 0.385 0.018 -0.097 -0.664 -0.305
(0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
12 Ownership conc. (Ln) -0.105 0.069 -0.393 0.487 0.093 -0.272 -0.687 -0.361
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
13 Commitments (Ln) 0.063 0.088 -0.211 0.023 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
14 Commitments change 0.061 -0.018 0.001 0.039 -0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.01) (0.32) (0.98) (0.05) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
15 Small cap residuals 0.108 -0.001 0.112 -0.040 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.97) (0.00) (0.04) (0.86) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
16 MSCI World 0.297 -0.048 0.042 0.022 -0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.26) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
17 Interest rate UK 0.160 -0.106 -0.060 0.126 -0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
18 Interest factor 0.172 -0.131 -0.027 0.138 -0.129 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
19 Spread UK -0.408 0.112 -0.086 -0.048 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
20 Spread factor -0.387 0.097 -0.067 -0.049 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
21 IPO volume (Ln) 0.361 -0.007 -0.165 0.089 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.69) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
22 IPO volume change 0.247 -0.035 0.022 0.023 -0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.05) (0.25) (0.24) (0.01) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Continued on next page
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
9 Cash / Total Assets
10 Cash / Market value 0.878
(0.00)
11 Inst. Ownership (Ln) -0.039 -0.080
(0.24) (0.02)
12 Ownership conc. (Ln) 0.056 0.068 0.889
(0.06) (0.03) (0.00)
13 Commitments (Ln) 0.028 0.019 0.138 0.089
(0.17) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00)
14 Commitments change -0.032 -0.031 0.002 -0.009 0.006
(0.11) (0.14) (0.95) (0.73) (0.65)
15 Small cap residuals 0.039 0.027 -0.057 -0.021 0.034 0.108
(0.05) (0.19) (0.03) (0.40) (0.01) (0.00)
16 MSCI World 0.007 -0.018 0.014 -0.001 -0.094 0.105 0.000
(0.74) (0.39) (0.59) (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
17 Interest rate UK -0.120 -0.124 -0.063 -0.061 -0.784 0.236 -0.110 0.155
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
18 Interest factor -0.120 -0.130 -0.124 -0.086 -0.762 0.250 -0.078 0.142
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
19 Spread UK -0.028 0.042 0.053 0.040 0.205 -0.019 -0.026 -0.499
(0.16) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.00) (0.12) (0.03) (0.00)
20 Spread factor -0.010 0.049 0.024 0.026 0.412 -0.122 -0.012 -0.625
(0.63) (0.02) (0.38) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00)
21 IPO volume (Ln) -0.004 -0.047 0.050 0.035 0.603 -0.106 -0.022 0.168
(0.83) (0.02) (0.06) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
22 IPO volume change 0.014 -0.019 -0.004 -0.005 0.064 0.171 -0.126 0.392
(0.50) (0.37) (0.87) (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
17 18 19 20 21
17 Interest rate UK
18 Interest factor 0.983
(0.00)
19 Spread UK -0.270 -0.288
(0.00) (0.00)
20 Spread factor -0.517 -0.489 0.893
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
21 IPO volume (Ln) -0.364 -0.330 -0.229 -0.057
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
22 IPO volume change 0.044 0.052 -0.324 -0.304 0.582
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Figure 1: Premium in calendar time. Dots represent premium observations, the solid line is
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Figure 2: Premium in event time (years from IPO). The solid line represents the average
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Figure 3: LOWESS prediction of premia (years from IPO). Locally weighted regression is
performed with bandwith 0.25.
Table 1: Summary statistics of independent and dependent variables
The ”Panel” column denotes if data is available for cross-sections (i), time series (t), or both (p).
Panel Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max N
NAV premium p -0.201 0.283 -2.564 -0.294 -0.154 -0.055 0.972 1792
Fund age (Ln) p 6.571 5.511 0.005 2.295 5.466 9.096 32.619 1784
Bid-ask spread p 0.020 0.031 -0.004 0.005 0.011 0.022 0.487 1792
Trading days p 0.617 0.381 0.000 0.212 0.848 0.955 1.000 1785
Beta p 0.653 1.893 -47.041 0.000 0.474 1.162 39.321 1792
Common law i 0.701 0.458 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1792
Venture capital trust i 0.220 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1792
Managment fee i 0.017 0.005 0.004 0.014 0.018 0.020 0.035 1787
Cash / Total assets p 0.111 0.153 0.000 0.015 0.052 0.141 1.000 1380
Cash / Market value p 0.174 0.249 0.000 0.020 0.077 0.217 1.515 1377
Inst. ownership p 0.319 0.255 0.005 0.112 0.254 0.500 1.150 877
Ownership conc. p 0.048 0.090 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.050 0.766 977
Commitments (USD bn) t 76.80 46.17 0.65 35.06 74.62 108.81 167.53 1792
Commitments change t 0.121 0.898 -0.835 -0.239 -0.074 0.272 21.786 1790
MSCI excess return t -0.016 0.083 -0.211 -0.047 0.002 0.041 0.175 1790
Interest rate UK % t 4.888 0.905 3.290 4.440 4.740 5.090 9.720 1792
Interest factor t -0.772 0.477 -1.696 -0.994 -0.834 -0.617 1.548 1792
Spread UK % t 1.582 1.359 0.160 0.840 1.090 1.610 6.370 1792
Spread factor t 0.553 1.208 -1.022 -0.252 0.169 1.075 4.562 1792
IPO volume (USD bn) t 90.71 52.69 9.13 52.91 78.89 113.27 214.34 1792
IPO volume change t -0.127 0.691 -1.924 -0.586 -0.114 0.436 1.489 1790
43Table 2: Post-IPO premia
A locally weighted regression with bandwith 0.25 is performed on log premiums. The initial premium at day
0 is a linear extrapolation from 2 days after the IPO when the ﬁrst premium observation occurred.
Years from IPO 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5
Premium -0.025 -0.073 -0.132 -0.181 -0.205 -0.210 -0.217 -0.223
Table 3: Return predictability
Reported are pooled OLS regressions of quarterly total stock returns with Newey-West standard errors using
4 lags. Model 3 is a pooled OLS regression with autocorrelation-adjusted variables using the Prais-Winsten
transformation. “1st quarter” is a dummy variable equal to one if an observation is recorded in the ﬁrst
quarter of a calendar year, “Q1 after AR” is a dummy variable equal to one in the ﬁrst quarter after annual
reports are published.
All All, AR(1) Buyout Venture FoF
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
MSCI World 0.769*** 0.768*** 0.774*** 0.746*** 1.122*** 0.630***
MSCI World Lag 1 -0.141 -0.139 -0.150 -0.131 -0.314 -0.056
MSCI World Lag 2 0.232*** 0.234*** 0.230*** -0.086 0.516** 0.277**
MSCI World Lag 3 0.267*** 0.269*** 0.264*** 0.105 0.497** 0.286**
SMB 0.544*** 0.542*** 0.546*** 0.287 1.240*** 0.326*
SMB Lag 1 0.115 0.117 0.127 0.028 0.237 0.096
HML 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.122 -0.236 0.100
HML Lag 1 -0.353*** -0.351*** -0.358*** -0.117 -0.693*** -0.326**
GBP -0.712*** -0.713*** -0.720*** -0.362 -1.360** -0.684**
EUR -0.188 -0.188 -0.193 -0.321 0.090 -0.215
JPY 0.229 0.231 0.232 0.455 0.101 0.148
NAV premium Lag 1 -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.068*** -0.042** -0.120** -0.068
NAV return Lag 1 0.091* 0.091* 0.107** 0.064 0.072 0.091
1st quarter 0.025** 0.007 0.007 0.054*** 0.028 0.003
2nd quarter -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 0.019 -0.038 0.004
3rd quarter -0.020 -0.027** -0.027* -0.017 -0.014 -0.025
Q1 after AR 0.035** 0.035**
Q2 after AR 0.010 0.010
Q3 after AR 0.016 0.016
Constant 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.010
adj. R2 0.295 0.299 0.318 0.233 0.419 0.286
N 967 967 967 320 260 387
Funds 67 67 67 23 23 21
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1 two-side signiﬁcance.
44Table 4: Return predictability - adjusted for autocorrelation
Reported are ﬁxed eﬀects regressions of quarterly total stock returns for Cochrane-Orcutt transformed vari-
ables. Model 3 is a pooled OLS regression with autocorrelation-adjusted variables using the Prais-Winsten
transformation for comparison with table 3. “1st quarter” is a dummy variable equal to one if an observation
is recorded in the ﬁrst quarter of a calendar year, “Q1 after AR” is a dummy variable equal to one in the
ﬁrst quarter after annual reports are published.
All All, AR(1) Buyout Venture FoF
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
MSCI World 0.797*** 0.792*** 0.774*** 0.791*** 1.075*** 0.675***
MSCI World Lag 1 -0.092 -0.093 -0.150 -0.058 -0.258 0.007
MSCI World Lag 2 0.282*** 0.284*** 0.230*** 0.013 0.502*** 0.332***
MSCI World Lag 3 0.277*** 0.276*** 0.264*** 0.204* 0.328* 0.339***
SMB 0.586*** 0.593*** 0.546*** 0.267 1.394*** 0.365**
SMB Lag 1 0.060 0.060 0.127 0.065 0.143 0.010
HML 0.033 0.028 0.019 0.175 -0.328 0.134
HML Lag 1 -0.376*** -0.375*** -0.358*** -0.233* -0.678*** -0.294**
GBP -0.793*** -0.798*** -0.720*** -0.600** -1.167** -0.761***
EUR -0.180 -0.176 -0.193 -0.238 0.025 -0.189
JPY 0.198 0.193 0.232 0.378* 0.070 0.148
NAV premium Lag 1 -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.068*** -0.139*** -0.142*** -0.142***
NAV return Lag 1 0.092** 0.097** 0.107** 0.005 0.034 0.108*
1st quarter 0.028** 0.008 0.007 0.067*** 0.032 0.004
2nd quarter -0.001 -0.009 -0.008 0.031 -0.041 0.006
3rd quarter -0.023* -0.031** -0.027* -0.021 -0.005 -0.027
Q1 after AR 0.039*** 0.035**
Q2 after AR 0.016 0.010
Q3 after AR 0.020 0.016
Constant 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001
R2 within 0.340 0.349 0.329 0.482 0.342
R2 total 0.327 0.335 0.318 0.270 0.486 0.327
ρ -0.050 -0.040 -0.043 -0.211 -0.075 -0.072
N 900 900 967 297 237 366
Funds 66 66 67 23 22 21
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1 two-side signiﬁcance.
45Table 5: Return predictability - variable CAPM coeﬃcients
Reported are pooled OLS regressions of residuals from fund-speciﬁc three-factor CAPM regressions on sea-
sonal dummy variables. Standard errors are Newey-West errors using 4 lags. Fama-French CAPM regressions
are estimated by Rt = α +
P3
k=0 βkMt−k + λ1SMBt + λ2SMBt−1 + λ3HMLt + λ4HMLt−1 + γ1GBPt +
γ2EURt + γ3JPYt + φ1PREMt−1 + φ2RNAVt−1 + ǫt where Rt and Mt are the respective excess fund and
market returns, SMB and HML are size and book-to-market factors, GBP, EUR, and JPY are excess
returns on currency portfolios, PREM is the NAV premium and RNAV is the NAV return. Model 3 is a
pooled OLS regression with autocorrelation-adjusted variables using the Prais-Winsten transformation. “1st
quarter” is a dummy variable equal to one if an observation is recorded in the ﬁrst quarter of a calendar
year, “Q1 after AR” is a dummy variable equal to one in the ﬁrst quarter after annual reports are published.
All All, AR(1) Buyout Venture FoF
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
1st quarter -0.007 -0.023 -0.018 0.025 -0.049 -0.007
2nd quarter -0.044*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.034** -0.104*** -0.011
3rd quarter -0.023** -0.033** -0.034** -0.014 -0.076*** 0.004
Q1 after AR 0.031* 0.032**
Q2 after AR 0.009 0.010
Q3 after AR 0.020 0.022
Constant -0.002 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 0.037 -0.020*
adj. R2 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.042 -0.006
N 967 967 967 320 260 387
Funds 67 67 67 23 23 21
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1 two-side signiﬁcance.
Table 6: Age eﬀect in buyout fund returns
Reported are OLS-coeﬃcients for quarterly total stock returns with Newey-West standard errors using 4
lags. Only buyout funds are included.
MSCI World 0.698 *** NAV return Lag 1 0.049 adj. R2 0.237
MSCI World Lag 1 -0.093 1st quarter 0.060 *** N 320
SMB 0.266 2nd quarter 0.012 Funds 23
HML 0.084 3rd quarter -0.012
GBP -0.231 Age < 1 year -0.036 ***
EUR -0.407 1 year 6 Age < 2 years -0.012
JPY 0.446 2 years 6 Age < 3 years -0.015
NAV premium Lag 1 -0.036 * Constant 0.009
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1 two-side signiﬁcance.
46Table 7: Regression of diﬀerenced premia
The dependent variable is logarithmic premium returns. Models 1 to 4 are pooled OLS regressions, where model 1 includes all variables where
suﬃcient data is available and model 2 includes only signiﬁcant variables. Pooled OLS models 5 to 7 use padded values for net asset values if they
are missing in some quarters. Model 8 to 11 are random eﬀects regressions assuming AR(1) errors. The estimated error correlation is reported as
ρ. Small-cap residuals are residuals from a regression of a small-cap factor that is composed of UK-, US-, and European small capitalization indices,
regressed on MSCI World returns.
Pooled OLS Padded NAV, pooled OLS AR(1) Padded NAV, AR(1)
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
MSCI World 0.378*** 0.207*** 0.418*** 0.386*** 0.308*** 0.207*** 0.474*** 0.394*** 0.340*** 0.316*** 0.221***
Small-cap residuals 0.042* 0.017 0.046* 0.042 0.026* 0.017 0.013 0.044* 0.049** 0.025 0.016
SMB 0.270 0.084 0.214 0.314 0.012 0.084 0.359** 0.261 0.173 0.016 0.077
SMB Lag 1 -0.372*** -0.354*** -0.378*** -0.427*** -0.300*** -0.354*** -0.347*** -0.359** -0.385*** -0.295*** -0.367***
HML 0.152 0.085 0.169 0.241* 0.138* 0.085 0.079 0.156 0.160* 0.137* 0.098
HML Lag 1 -0.548*** -0.238*** -0.459*** -0.506*** -0.350*** -0.238*** -0.292** -0.549*** -0.450*** -0.352*** -0.241***
1st quarter 0.002 0.030** -0.003 -0.015 0.033 0.030** 0.037 0.000 -0.006 0.033* 0.028**
2nd quarter 0.052*** 0.029*** 0.032** 0.036** 0.046*** 0.029*** 0.027* 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.030***
3rd quarter 0.006 0.020 0.001 -0.017 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.005 0.004 0.023 0.019
Age (Log) 0.011** 0.010*** 0.006 0.006 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.008* 0.011 0.010* 0.012** 0.010**
∆ IPO volume (Log) 0.029 0.040*** 0.029 0.039* 0.030** 0.040*** 0.031 0.029 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.040***
∆ IPO volume Lag 1 0.070*** 0.028*** 0.046** 0.074*** 0.030** 0.028*** 0.028* 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.032** 0.030***
∆ Cash / Total assets 0.006
∆ Ownership factor -0.032* -0.018
∆ Commitments (Log) 0.030 0.030** 0.030 0.030**
∆ Beta -0.006* -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006** -0.008* -0.005*** -0.008** -0.007** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.005***
∆ Interest factor -0.040 -0.036 -0.046 -0.043
∆ Spread factor -0.078*** -0.066*** -0.051*** -0.064*** -0.075*** -0.066*** -0.059*** -0.079*** -0.059*** -0.076*** -0.064***
∆ Bid-ask spread (Log) 0.005 0.014 0.006 0.016
∆ Days traded (Log) 0.006 -0.004 0.006 -0.005
Constant -0.031* -0.038*** -0.017 -0.013 -0.050*** -0.038*** -0.037** -0.029 -0.025* -0.050*** -0.038***
R2 within 0.382 0.369 0.218 0.178
R2 total 0.388 0.196 0.312 0.397 0.238 0.196 0.289 0.388 0.375 0.238 0.196
ρ 0.034 0.031 -0.064 -0.096
N 849 2362 781 623 1788 2362 1018 849 1012 1788 2362
Funds 66 99 52 43 99 99 59 66 68 99 99
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1 two-side signiﬁcance.
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7Table 8: Regression results for NAV premia
This table reports regressions logarithmic NAV premia. Models 1 to 7 are random eﬀects regressions using the Baltagi and Wu (1999) GLS method.
Model 8 and 9 are OLS random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects regressions, and model 10 is a pooled OLS regression with Prais-Winsten transformed variables
to account for AR(1) errors. “Small-cap residuals” are residuals from regressing a small-cap factor on MSCI World excess returns. This small-cap
factor is constructed from U.K., U.S., and European small-cap index excess returns. “Interest factor” and “Spread factor” are the main common
factors of U.K., U.S., and Euro interest rates and yield spreads, respectively.
GLS RE, AR(0) FE, AR(0) Pooled, AR(1)
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Age < 1 year 0.099*** 0.080*** 0.083** 0.095** 0.104** 0.103*** 0.132*** 0.183*** 0.081***
1 year 6 Age < 2 years 0.057** 0.042* 0.064** 0.071* 0.073** 0.058** 0.090*** 0.131*** 0.050**
2 years 6 Age < 3 years 0.025 0.011 0.038* 0.036 0.028 0.027 0.047** 0.074*** 0.020
Age (Log) -0.030***
Bid-Ask Spread (Log) -0.055*** -0.081*** -0.049*** -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.049***
Days traded (Log) -0.038*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.027 -0.033** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.039***
Beta -0.006** -0.007*** -0.005* -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.003 -0.002 -0.008***
Common law 0.139*** 0.151*** 0.135*** 0.158*** 0.152*** 0.132*** 0.141*** 0.131*** 0.176***
VCT -0.020 -0.001 -0.006 -0.014 0.028 -0.016 -0.027 -0.054*
Venture fund 0.105** 0.127*** 0.089* 0.095 0.103* 0.099*** 0.105** 0.104** 0.141***
Fund of funds 0.106** 0.109*** 0.103** 0.132** 0.127** 0.098** 0.107** 0.122*** 0.106***
Management fee 1.776 1.695 0.751 0.467 -0.510 1.824 2.164 0.336
Cash / Total assets 0.044
Inst. ownership (Log) -0.002
Ownership conc. (Log) -0.005
Commitments (Log) 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.063** 0.054** 0.066*** 0.054*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.066***
IPO volume (Log) 0.041*** 0.032** 0.037* 0.042** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.033**
MSCI World 0.020 0.163** 0.103 0.088 0.080 0.175** 0.004 0.027 0.031
Small-cap residuals 0.072*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.107*** 0.094*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.083***
Interest factor 0.080*** 0.085*** 0.073*** 0.089** 0.091** 0.077*** 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.087***
Interest UK 0.041***
Spread factor -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.064*** -0.092*** -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.078*** -0.073*** -0.080***
Spread UK -0.060***
Constant -1.776*** -0.694*** -1.579*** -1.752*** -1.714*** -1.698*** -1.909*** -2.077*** -1.987*** -1.682***
R2 within 0.400 0.331 0.321 0.461 0.428 0.391 0.402 0.408 0.411
R2 total 0.339 0.289 0.271 0.379 0.362 0.334 0.341 0.333 0.256
ρ 0.528 0.556 0.581 0.557 0.553 0.536 0.526
N 1458 1458 1211 720 812 1463 1458 1458 1458 1458
Funds 98 98 80 58 64 99 98 98 98 98
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1 two-side signiﬁcance.
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